40 Years On: Reflections on How an International Fund Supported Peace and Prosperity in Ireland – Thomas P. Foley

Riddell Hall, Queen’s University Belfast
September 24, 2026

Thomas P. Foley, J.D., L.H.D. (honoris causa)

Thank you for inviting me to be part of this symposium commemorating the 40th anniversary of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). The John and Pat Hume Foundation has set quite a standard with the breadth of this panel: Lt. Gov. Thomas P. O’Neill, SDLP leader Mark Durkan and Ambassador Sean Donlan. I am honored to be in their company here this morning. Our moderator, Professor Paul Arthur, and I have been distant colleagues for a long time, all the way back to when he stayed in my questionable digs back in Washington, D.C.

I look forward to the panels that follow us as well, with two former chairs of the IFI (Willie McCarter and Paddy Harte) and three recipient organizations of those grants (represented by Dymphna McGlade, Emma Shaw and Kayla Henry), so we can all learn more about the work that has been accomplished by the International Fund for Ireland over the last four decades.

A special thanks to the Hume family: what a wonderful way to remember your fabulous parents John and Pat. Of course, our appreciation also to Tim Attwood and his team at the John and Pat Hume Foundation for putting all this together. Thank you, Tim and team.

I believe that the purview of the other two panels is to measure the impact of the IFI and its several thousand grants since its inception. I am sure we all look forward to some great examples of this work. For now, as I understand it, our job—my job—on this panel is to describe the origins of this initiative by the United States and five other nations, a unique investment in another nation’s economic competitiveness and future.

I should say at the start that, from a United States perspective, this was not about aiding a key national security partner in a critical geopolitical position—which is the customary avenue to American foreign aid. Rather, this was about assisting an island, with a population the size of our 38th largest state, Indiana, that was beset by hundreds of years of politically disabling divisiveness. This was about helping an island that was the ancestral home to 43 million Americans (in 1986, when Congress enacted the legislation to create the IFI). This was about investing in the best way we in America knew how: with funds to create jobs on both sides of that divide.

The theory then, and now, is that a good job is the best answer to most social problems. That idea was key to the United States and our partner nations making these investments in that small island, both 40 years ago and today.

That said, I hope to do my part on this panel by bringing a perhaps unique perspective that connects to the IFI in its various stages: as an idea, as a reality, and as a legacy to the mighty and the meek who brought the IFI—from conception to maturity to ideal—to the table. Unique in the sense that I:

• volunteered for nearly three years in Belfast as a peace and justice worker during some of the worst of the Troubles, first in 1975–76 for three months with Voluntary Service Belfast and later from 1979 to 1981 full-time primarily with the Peace People, which was led at that time by 1977 Nobel Peace Prize winner Mairead Corrigan-Maguire, and where I served as the Executive Committee Member for Justice Issues;
• co-founded in 1981, with civil rights lawyer and longtime Queen’s University Belfast law professor Tom Hadden, the award-winning Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), which is now in its 45th year of operation as a key voice for human and civil rights in Northern Ireland;
• worked on these issues with key leaders in the United States House of Representatives during Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill’s tenure as Speaker of that body when I served as a foreign policy aide and speechwriter for Massachusetts Congressman Jim Shannon;
• served as counsel on Irish issues and chief speechwriter for the Minority Chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then-Senator Joe Biden;
• was appointed by President Biden and USAID Administrator Samantha Power as a US Observer to the IFI from 2021–24.

My work for Congressman Shannon and Senator Biden coincided exactly with the timeline Tommy O’Neill outlined for us, from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s outright rejection of the New Ireland Forum through to:

• Mrs. Thatcher’s February 1985 address to a Joint Session of Congress (gaveled in by Lieutenant Governor O’Neill’s father);
• the signing of the November 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (inconceivable just one year earlier);
• the 1985–86 debate over the controversial U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty in the U.S. Senate;
• the IFI, conceived in Speaker O’Neill’s office in the U.S. House of Representatives and passed into law in September 1986.

My remarks will, I hope, complement my colleagues’ presentations by focusing on:

• The contributors who made the IFI happen
• The context in Northern Ireland that underlined the urgency
• The context in America that solidified support from multiple constituencies
• The concentration on relationship building that cleared historic obstacles
• The competition with related and unrelated issues (again, at home and abroad)
• The consensus on the facts that cemented final passage

It is my hope that headlining with these six words provides the shortest roadmap to the history of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and that these six “C” words will best help us to understand how the IFI, as it is now known, came into existence 40 years ago.

First, the Major Contributors Who Made This Happen

The story of the IFI does not happen without four American elected officials, colleagues who began discussions with each other on the situation in Northern Ireland as early as 1977 (during Jimmy Carter’s Presidency), who formalized their association in 1981, and who together issued powerful annual statements, usually on St. Patrick’s Day, on the situation in Northern Ireland for many years thereafter.

These were of course America’s Four Horsemen: U.S. Speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill, Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and New York Governor Hugh Carey. They eventually issued these statements on behalf of a larger group of mostly Irish American elected officials called the Friends of Ireland, whose youngest member at the time of its founding was a little-known first-term U.S. Senator from Delaware named Joseph R. Biden.

These annual statements were crystal clear about the counterproductivity of violence coming from both communities in the North, from the British Army, and from the police. They were also consistently vocal about what they saw as the unjust law and practices that had provoked much of this violence. They were especially unstinting in their criticism, in fact condemnation, of:

• all the violence,
• those who perpetrated it, and vitally,
• those who raised money in America to finance it.

It is important that we recognize that their very specific condemnation of all the violence, including most especially that which came from the largely Catholic, nationalist/republican community, came at some risk to their own political viability. Tip O’Neill represented North Cambridge in Massachusetts, and his family came from a working-class Irish American neighborhood in his district. Moynihan grew up in the Hell’s Kitchen enclave in New York City and Hugh Carey was a Brooklyn boy. These two communities were filled, like North Cambridge, with first, second, and third generation families of Irish descent. And the Kennedy family’s long association with all causes Irish is well known and was national in its reach.

Each of their electoral districts, two in New York and two in Massachusetts, had significant populations of people of Irish descent. Many in their electorates initially supported the violence coming from the Provisional IRA in particular. These communities were barraged by spokesmen, recruiters, and fundraisers for organizations like NORAID (Northern Aid for Irish Freedom). It was not at all uncommon for working-class people in their districts to donate something from their paychecks every week to NORAID to “help the boys back home” for what they saw as “the cause.” And not just in those four districts; first-generation Irish American factory workers across the United States, like my father and his two brothers in Philadelphia, passed the proverbial hat and “did their part.”

These four elected officials came out against loud voices in their own communities that were promoting violence in Northern Ireland. They did so because it was clear to the Four Horsemen that the violence was counterproductive especially, but far from exclusively, in places like Belfast and Derry. Their stance stemmed from their moral and logical reasoning and predated the statistical evidence that rendered such a stance well-nigh scientific. It would be some years before the data became available showing just exactly who was killing whom in Northern Ireland—more Catholics were killed by Catholics by far than by any other demographic: police, soldiers, loyalist terrorist groups, etc. In the official count, it was not even close. We know all this now, thanks to a Dublin-based journalist who made it his mission to track down every atrocity since the Troubles began again in 1968 and traced down for almost every case (there were—are—still a few unsolved murders on the books) who claimed credit or who were convicted of that crime.

On one of John Hume’s trips to America, I served as his host at one of the largest St. Patrick’s Day dinner gatherings in the country, the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick event in Scranton, Pennsylvania. John’s visit coincided with the first publication of those stats about the violence and its perpetrators. John Hume announced those statistics to the 700 tuxedo-clad men in attendance, including the Irish American Governor of Pennsylvania in whose Cabinet I then served. They were stunned. They had no idea that so many of the victims raised in their Catholic faith were killed as a result of actions by their own co-religionists. I wonder now how many of those men considered the real possibility that the path of the bullet that pierced a Catholic boy or girl on a Belfast corner or Derry street sprung not from the Catholic gunman’s trigger finger but from their own donated dollars? Did they realize then what “did your part” meant?

Tip O’Neill would be most closely identified with the effort to pass an IFI, and for many reasons, familiar to you all, this is right. But there would never have been even the idea of an IFI, let alone an Anglo-Irish Agreement (and much more), if these four leaders hadn’t gone against the views of some in their own families, close neighbors, and many constituents to speak as one and to draw an oratorical line in the sand to oppose the violence that came from the barrel of a gun and the violence that came from unjust law.

It should also be noted how very appropriate it is that this commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the IFI should be sponsored by the John and Pat Hume Foundation, because no one on either side of the Atlantic was more effective at showing American political leaders the best way forward than John Hume. These four American leaders knew him well, trusted him, and listened to him. Without the Four Horsemen, and without John Hume—there would have been no IFI.

It is critical to the history of the IFI and to the story of American response to the Troubles that we understand and emphasize the signature role that these four Irish American leaders played, in concert with Hume. It is also important to understand the winds into which they first began broadcasting their message of a nonviolent way forward. Which leads me to the second critical word as we frame this history—

Second, the Context in Northern Ireland

I think it’s important that we understand and remember the context both at home, in Ireland and Northern Ireland, and abroad, particularly in England and in the United States. The context at home in Northern Ireland was one of a long series of personal tragedies, sometimes on a daily basis, and also an environment of economic devastation.

On the personal tragedy side, it is all too well known to us here in America now. William Butler Yeats’s apocryphal lines perhaps best described the situation:

Too long a sacrifice
Can make a stone of the heart.
Oh, when may it suffice?

The partition of Ireland, civil war, extended periods of violence and unrest, 70 years of what we had come to know as the “Troubles,” these had all brought us to that point on part of this small island, a region the geographic size of our fourth smallest state, Connecticut. “O, when may it suffice?” Yeats asked. Indeed.

When conversations about the IFI were beginning in earnest in America in the mid-1980s, the butcher’s bill for the Troubles looked like this:

• 20 years of violence
• over 2,700 people dead
• over 26,000 serious injuries

Adjusted proportionally for the United States, that violence would equate to 270,000 deaths and 1.4 million serious injuries—nearly five times American losses in Vietnam. The pain and persistence of the Troubles was dark tragedy in such a small country and was so recognized by the Four Horsemen and other Irish American leaders in the United States. But these are numbers; we cannot begin to tabulate the broken hearts and broken dreams, lost lives, lost limbs, lost livelihoods, lost souls, closed minds and cluttered consciences.

When I lived in Belfast from 1979 to 1981, on leave from Yale Law School, I served as a volunteer peace worker through the hunger strike period. I witnessed, and experienced first-hand, the kind of anguish that my grandparents thought they had left behind. In one month, at a time when I still recorded such things, the following happened:

• A 17-year-old boy was shot dead by the British Army for joyriding.
• A Catholic police officer was shot and killed by his co-religionists on the steps of a church where he had just attended Mass.
• A prison warden was murdered in front of his young family on the way to church.
• A 24-year-old man, a father of three small children, was shot dead on the allegation that he was an informer.
• Nine police were murdered in a mortar attack as they sat in a heavily barricaded police station enjoying cups of tea between shifts.

You know you could pick almost any month from any year between 1969 and 1986, and you can come up with a similar list of atrocities, casualties, victims, heroes, or just plain dead sons, daughters, sisters, brothers, fathers, and mothers, human beings all.

By scale, the numbers were not overwhelming, about 100 deaths a year. If you made a list of the bloodiest conflicts going on in the world at that time, Northern Ireland might not make it into the top 25. It was less than the annual murder toll in my home city of Philadelphia, which at the time had a total population comparable to Northern Ireland.

That is not to say the toll on the country was any less significant, and that is part of the messaging from voices like Nobelists Hume and Corrigan-Maguire that the Four Horsemen understood.

Cardinal Ó Fiaich was the Catholic primate of Ireland when I lived there. In a funeral homily he delivered, he said that he personally knew 30 people who had been killed in the Troubles—then he proceeded to name them. If you think about that kind of scale I would say the average person in Northern Ireland at that time probably knew at least 10 people who had been killed or injured or imprisoned in the Troubles. One of my favorite Seamus Heaney poems, Station Island, was published shortly before he received his Nobel Prize for Literature, and is about the roughly dozen people he personally knew and the immediate circumstances of their deaths in the Troubles.

Northern Ireland is a country of one and a half million people. It is comprised of dozens of small towns and villages; even the two biggest cities are largely made up of little enclaves and self-contained neighborhoods. I lived in a set of tiny row homes behind the old Ormeau Bakery in Belfast. I learned quickly that Belfast is very like big American cities like Boston and Philadelphia, cities of tight-knit cultural enclaves and clan-like associations of neighbors. In Boston, there is Southie, Roxbury, Dorchester, the North End, and further out Quincy, Wollaston and so on, all very identifiable localized areas where, as one popular Boston-based sitcom put it, “everybody knows your name.” The Ardoyne, Ballymurphy, the Shankill, Sandy Row, the Lower Falls, Rathcoole are all self-contained communities, Belfast neighborhoods, in which everybody knows everybody (or went to school with their cousin or your mother knows their aunt…).

When someone was implicated in the Troubles—accused, imprisoned, killed or injured—the circle is literally like the stone thrown in the still pond with the concentric waves reaching all the way to the shore. Each personal tragedy in Northern Ireland pulled on a long chain of human connectedness and directly moved many other people to grief, sorrow, anger, pain, fear, fatigue, resolution. So even though on an American-sized scale—the cups of blood spilled equaled that lost in violence in a single American city—it was still every day a very personal tragedy. The insight provided to Irish American elected officials and other influential observers from first-hand accounts like those of the two Nobel Peace Prize winners, Hume from Derry and Corrigan-Maguire from Belfast, is what helped inspire the Four Horsemen to begin the journey that led to the IFI and other developments that proved so positive for that small island.

The second part of the context in Northern Ireland is the economic situation at that time. This is what led even more directly to Speaker O’Neill’s initial draft of an IFI bill in the US House of Representatives, a bill he saw as an American-style jobs bill with hoped-for reconciliation side effects.

During my initial entrée to Northern Ireland in 1975–76, I spent three months as a Voluntary Service Belfast volunteer repairing bombed-out windows and organizing youth get-togethers. As measured in the RUC Chief Constable’s Annual Report, 1975 was the worst single year of the Troubles in terms of violent incidents (and the economic and physical devastation was severe even before that bloody year). The downtown Belfast business district, serving a regional population of almost 500,000, was all barricaded and blocked off, completely inaccessible by car. Shoppers brave enough to travel there on foot could expect to be searched multiple times during a routine one-hour trip, and individual stores were only accessible through metal detectors and frequent body searches.

When I returned to Belfast full-time in 1979, the economic situation had deteriorated further. The economic toll at that time is best described in these two pieces of data:

• 75 percent of Northern Ireland’s gross domestic product depended on British Government expenditures, and
• 45 percent of all the jobs were government jobs.

No economy can long survive with numbers like that, with or without sustained bombing campaigns like those experienced in Belfast beginning around 1969.

This was the kind of data that Speaker O’Neill and his colleagues saw when they first envisioned a jobs/reconciliation fund for Northern Ireland. This was the kind of data that prompted Congressman Jim Shannon in an August 1983 New York Times op-ed to call for a mini-Marshall Plan for Northern Ireland. This was the kind of data that prompted then-Senator Joe Biden’s similar call in 1986 on the floor of the U.S. Senate during the US/UK Extradition Treaty debate.

Shannon argued in his NYT piece, published a full three years before the IFI passed, that:

“It may be necessary to consider a mini-Marshall Plan for Northern Ireland. Britain could not bear the burden of that restructuring alone, but a well-conceived economic recovery plan involving Britain, the Republic and the United States could go far toward resolving many of the causes that underlie the violence.

The way forward is through democratic processes and a commitment to social and economic justice. If those who seize power with the bomb and the bullet are to be turned away, Mrs. Thatcher would do well to seize her opportunity and implement these reforms.” [1]

Senator Biden amplified those remarks three years later when it looked like the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty was going to be paired on a single vote with the IFI legislation, which may have resulted in blocking the IFI. Biden’s strong statements, his relationship and work with the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, and numerous behind-the-scenes efforts by leaders in the House, the Senate, and the White House averted that outcome, and in the end allowed the IFI to pass on its own merits.

None of this so far answers the question of how my side of the Atlantic suddenly came together on all these issues. Part of an answer to that question lay in…

Third, the Context in America

The context in the United States at the time was also important and guided certain elements of the strategy by Speaker O’Neill and his team in the U.S. House of Representatives. The issue in America was not associated violence on the ground or economic devastation related to the Troubles; the issue in America, rather, was competing voices calling for a different approach, some of them excusing, condoning, or even advocating for greater violence. Groups like NORAID, the Congressional Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs, and the Irish National Caucus competed with the Four Horsemen and the Friends of Ireland for the attention of Irish Americans on a variety of issues.

At the end of the day, though, the Four Horsemen and most of the Friends of Ireland stood firm on the view that violence was counterproductive and that violence would achieve little for anyone, nationalist/republican or loyalist/unionist, north or south, on that small island. One major reason for this view on the violence is that key Irish American leaders listened to voices on the ground in Northern Ireland.

A story and several examples are in order. The story: during the Vietnam War, Speaker O’Neill was meeting with students at his alma mater, Boston College. When asked about the war, he explained that he had talked personally to two Presidents, that he had talked to the generals, that he had talked to the Secretary of Defense, and that they all argued for our continuing engagement there. An undergraduate student named Patrick McCarthy stood up and asked, “How many times have you been briefed by the other side?” [2] McCarthy wanted to know how often O’Neill talked to those opposed to the war in Vietnam, including the veterans of that conflict themselves.

That question from a college student stopped the Speaker in his tracks. He changed his approach and started talking to soldiers in his own district about what was really happening on the ground in Vietnam. It changed his whole outlook on that war, and he became part of the group that opposed efforts to continue that war.

Perhaps because of his learning during Vietnam, Speaker O’Neill proved a prolific listener on Northern Ireland. Besides first-hand voices like John Hume and Mairead Corrigan-Maguire, and alongside his chief of staff Kirk O’Donnell and longtime aide Kevin Peterson, O’Neill deliberately sought out voices loud and small with lived experience in Northern Ireland. I had an early and unexpected occasion to be one of those voices. In early 1980, I sat next to Corrigan-Maguire while she testified before a dozen or more members of the Friends of Ireland, including on that day the Speaker and Senator Kennedy. When she finished her testimony and personal plea for greater efforts to stop the flow of American money from NORAID and other collection baskets in U.S. neighborhoods into the streets of Belfast and Derry, the Speaker asked me to speak. I attempted to demur, explaining that I was an American and not from Belfast, that I was merely a volunteer there. He said, “That’s good enough for me—you live there, you see it every day, tell us about your experience.”

As a result of that opportunity, I came to know his Chief of Staff Kirk O’Donnell and his longtime aide Kevin Peterson and visited with them every time I came back to Washington, D.C. They hired me to work for Congressman Shannon after I finished law school. When the IFI bill came up, by which time I was working for Senator Biden, the Speaker sent Peterson over to the Senate side of the Capitol to see what I thought of the language. I had only minor suggestions; it was well conceived and drafted. I was especially impressed by the intention to include other nations in this mini-Marshall Plan effort.

I also noted the Speaker’s determination for shared leadership and mutual responsibility: first, to make sure that the leadership of any such IFI body would rotate on a set basis between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; second, that the leadership from Northern Ireland would rotate between the two communities there, Nationalist and Loyalist; and third, that none of the apparatus of such a body would become a sinecure for “career board-sitters.”

Listening, by these two Senators, the Speaker, and the Governor, to voices on the ground was key to the eventual passage of the IFI and to turning American hearts away from supporting or funding violent approaches.

Senator Kennedy’s top aide, Carey Parker, had a similar approach. As our fellow panelist Mark Durkan has pointed out, Parker kept a list of phone numbers of people embedded in various parts of Northern Ireland. He called that list on a rotating basis to get their on-the-ground take on recent events, a very effective form of listening and central for getting a unified approach to passing acts like the IFI in a divided Congress. This habit of listening broadly also proved critical in the end for securing support from President Reagan at a time when some respected career State Department hands were advising a hands-off approach, an approach in line with the wishes of their opposite numbers in the U.K. Foreign Office in London and at the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.

There was still yet another context in all this that required diplomatic attention in the mid-1980s, that of the competition on an emerging range of proposals and issues between the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland stoked by a variety of Irish American interest groups.

Then, a key question became how did the key actors/leaders bring together such historically (and sometimes dramatically) opposed (on issues that had nothing to do with Northern Ireland) entities. The beginning of an answer to that question was…

Fourth, the Concentration on Relationships

During the debate on the IFI legislation in 1986, a whole sequence of consequential meetings, formal and informal, occurred that established a purposeful pattern of relationship-building that helped clear each hurdle as it emerged. These relationships included those between the parties in the United Kingdom and Ireland but encompassed key relationships within the U.S. and between U.S. and European leaders, too.

Initially, at the very top. Of course, it all started with the Thatcher-Reagan relationship, two leaders joined at the hip on all things to do with the Soviet Union and often singing from the same conservative economic hymnal. Reagan’s previous engagement on Irish issues had been tangential, at best. Mrs. Thatcher’s close relationship with Airey Neave, killed in the 1979 INLA car bombing, contributed to her hardline views throughout the hunger strike period and on everything to do with Northern Ireland. The 1984 PIRA bombing at the Conservative Party national conference in Brighton very nearly killed the Prime Minister as well, and solidified her opposition on all things Northern Irish.

Similarly, Reagan’s close personal connection to William Clark, who held several senior-level cabinet positions, proved critical. Ambassador Donlan has often described the relationship that he and his team very intentionally built with Clark, who had several connections to Ireland, perhaps most significantly that Clark and his wife had honeymooned there on a four-day leave from his military post in Germany. Clark wasn’t just a high official in the Reagan Administration; he was close personally to the President himself and proud of his Irish heritage.

Additionally, President Reagan also ended up having a personal connection to Irish Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald, as Reagan and FitzGerald traced their ancestry to the very same Tipperary village, Ballyporeen. There was even a report that they had ancestral godparents in common. President and Mrs. Reagan paid a visit to the village in 1984, not long before the sequence of events that led to the IFI began. I expect that this kind of personal attachment to a real place where your own ancestors had lived may have helped increase President Reagan’s willingness to engage in serious policy work that affected the island of those same ancestors.

Finally, at these highest levels, all these relationships mattered greatly, but the pivotal relationship in the end was the connection between Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan and vicariously from Tip O’Neill through Reagan to Margaret Thatcher. Much has been written about an O’Neill-Reagan divide, including the occasional but very public antagonism exhibited through their spokesmen—the gap between them on multiple issues ranging from Central America to social security. There was also some truth to the story, though, that after the workday was over they could still tolerate and even enjoy each other’s company, buoyed on occasion by their Irish connection.

Reagan’s visits to the Irish Embassy in Washington, D.C. on St. Patrick’s Day with Speaker O’Neill, Senator Kennedy, and other Irish American dignitaries underlined their ability to enjoy the banter and to appreciate their foundational connection as Americans of Irish descent. The Speaker’s invention of the St. Patrick’s Day luncheon was central to bringing all parties to his Congressional table for lunch and ultimately for much more important discussions.

All these connections mattered greatly in the year that followed Thatcher’s abject dismissal of the New Ireland Forum. It was the Speaker’s personal letter to President Reagan on the Irish issue that the President shared with Thatcher at their Camp David meeting in December 1984. It was the Speaker’s insistence that her address to Congress in February 1985 include some reference to Northern Ireland, a condition probably communicated to her people from numerous sources including Reagan’s friend Bill Clark, the Speaker’s Chief of Staff Kirk O’Donnell, and others. And it was that address that re-opened a door that she seemingly sealed shut after the New Ireland Forum.

It would be interesting to compare the first draft of Thatcher’s address to the Joint Session of Congress in 1985 and then the final one that ultimately included six paragraphs on Northern Ireland, one-eighth of a speech that also covered the challenge posed by the Soviet Union, NATO, European solidarity, developing-world poverty, and national economies.

She began that part of her address with these words: “Garret FitzGerald and I—and our respective governments—are united in condemning terrorism.” [3] She saluted the efforts of American elected officials to convey that same message, the message from the Four Horsemen and the Friends of Ireland, as she cited the fact that 70% of those killed in the Troubles at that point in time were in fact Irish men and women.

She then went to a place that she had not visited in her public addresses before, a place much different from where she had signaled outright rejection of the New Ireland Forum’s bilateral, bipartisan work by the four constitutional parties in the Republic of Ireland. She said:

“We recognize the differing traditions and identities of the two parts of the community of Northern Ireland—the Nationalist and the Unionist. We seek a political way forward acceptable to them both, which respects them both.”

She finished this part of her speech to the U.S. Congress with a commitment to collaboration:

“Garret FitzGerald and I will continue to consult together in the quest for peace and stability in Northern Ireland and we hope we will have your continued support for our joint efforts to find a way forward.”

This was an absolute reversal of her “out, out, out” remarks not one full year earlier in which she rejected the three alternative structures proposed by the New Ireland Forum. A major reason for that reversal was the series of relationships that had been cultivated at the highest levels in multiple nation states. These personal relationships were key to the series of positive developments that happened, all within 18 months of the New Ireland Forum blowup: the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which truly seemed a pipedream not 12 months previous; the successful amendments to and disposition of the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, where both sides could claim some success; and the creation of the IFI.

A critical part of the relationship building related to the “Irish issue” happened exclusively on American soil. The O’Neill-Kennedy-Moynihan-Hume-Donlan-Sharkey nexus was very important in those early days of agreement.

Then there were Senators Dodd, Eagleton, Bradley, Kerry, and future Speaker then-Majority Leader Tom Foley from Washington State (no relation to the author). Congressmen like Ed Feighan from Cleveland, whose aide on these issues was future American journalist and Clinton aide George Stephanopoulos, Bill Coyne from Pittsburgh and Jim Shannon from Lawrence, Massachusetts, with whom I had begun my Washington days, were key players in those early days of agreement. Across the political aisle, Congressmen Madigan from Illinois and McDade from Scranton, Pennsylvania were regular Republican allies who helped pave the way. Then-Senator Biden had a unique role as ranking member on Senate Foreign Relations, where he took the lead role in fixing the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty. Eventually, when the IFI bill passed the House and reached the Senate, Biden was well positioned to make sure that it did not become a casualty in the fight over extradition. Senator Kennedy worked with Senator Paul Laxalt from Nevada, a close Reagan ally and another Republican whose engagement was crucial at several points. Senator Biden, along with future American Ambassador to Ireland Dan Rooney, helped bring Republican Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania into the debate.

The key aides for many of these leaders knew each other well and collaborated frequently—Carey Parker with Kennedy in the Senate and Kirk O’Donnell with the Speaker in the House were the undisputed leaders of that group. The Irish Embassy’s then-political counselor and future Ambassador for Ireland on three continents Jim Sharkey was relentless on multiple fronts, and his close friendship with his schoolmate John Hume was also very important. Kevin Peterson, trusted aide to the Speaker, informally “chaired” the group of younger staffers who met regularly to compare notes and plan support for the issues raised by the Friends of Ireland and to figure ways around the roadblocks occasionally erected by Irish American groups with different agendas.

That younger group included Werner Brandt with then-Majority Leader Foley; Jordan Clark with Congressman McDade; Matthew Murray, and eventually Nancy Soderberg, with Senator Kennedy; Tom Melia from Senator Moynihan’s office; and me from the Shannon/Biden ship. Other members came and went depending on the issue, but this core group of elected leaders and the combination of both longtime and (some) fresh-faced staffers first built the tracks and then made the schedule that kept the trains on Irish issues running on time through the early and mid-1980s when all these issues were popping (and occasionally getting in each other’s way).

This younger core of staffers engaged on Irish issues were critical to fending off challenges from disparate, sometimes well-meaning elements pushing more divisive agendas and, occasionally, support for the continuation of violent solutions, funded by American sources, to the Troubles. There were a lot of issues affecting Northern Ireland on the plate in that short span of time that culminated in the IFI in 1986.

With all this good behind-the-scenes work, the path was still strewn with lots of misunderstandings about what was actually happening on the ground in Northern Ireland. However, at that time there was an emerging…

Fifth, Consensus on the Facts

Behind the scenes in Ireland and Northern Ireland, new voices and new reports were providing factual information that was key to producing movement on both the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the IFI and fostering enough support to dilute substantially the original proposed U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty. I mention them here because though not always noticed in a dramatic way at the time, they provided important documentary material with which to bring home the main arguments in favor of these agreements.

Let me give three examples.

Initially, factual information began to make its way to—and be heard in—the U.S. Thanks to messengers like Hume from Derry, Donlan and Sharkey at the Irish Embassy in Washington, D.C., Corrigan-Maguire from West Belfast, and others, there was a growing awareness that nationalist communities were suffering greatly, and that the vast majority of those killed and injured were from those communities. That was exactly the opposite of what hard factory-working Irish Americans like my relatives had been led to believe. In the end, those reports from overseas proved correct. Subsequent research has only reinforced the reports on the real cost of the violence: far more Catholics were killed by other Catholics than by the UDA, UVF, RUC, British Army or any other violent force combined.

Importantly, American elected officials listened. They listened to people from the front lines of the Troubles.

John Hume’s voice and message resonated for decades here in America for several different reasons. He scored high in standardized testing and got admitted free of charge to St. Columb’s, an outstanding secondary boys’ school in Derry, where he joined the likes of lifelong friends like Ambassador Sharkey, Nobel Prize-winning poet Seamus Heaney, musician Phil Coulter, novelist Seamus Deane, our moderator academic Paul Arthur, and a host of other future political, labor, religious and community leaders. Hume was also an elected official, eventually a member of three distinct parliaments, and knew how to speak that language of bureaucracy and protocol. That fluency alone opened many doors for him in America and in Europe. He spent time studying for the priesthood at Maynooth, left that to become a teacher, helped a local priest create a credit union so Catholics could purchase homes—think Jimmy Stewart in “It’s a Wonderful Life.” [4] He was an able historian of his own country, was well known and liked on both sides of the divide in his hometown. He was the most capable and respected messenger to America on the situation in Northern Ireland for almost four decades.

Mairead Corrigan-Maguire was also very effective for several different reasons, though for a much shorter period of time than Hume. First, she was not an elected official. She was a secretary at Guinness Northern Ireland, one of eight children in a West Belfast family. Her father was a window washer; her mother regularly went to Mass with longtime Provisional Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams’ mother. When three of her sister Anne’s children were killed by a runaway vehicle (after its freelancing Provisional IRA gunmen engaged in a shootout with the British Army), Mairead ended up as the unlikely spokesperson for her family. Her initial appearance before a TV camera, standing in her father’s tiny rose garden outside the front door of their terraced house just off the Andersonstown Road in the heart of West Belfast, bloomed into the creation of the Nobel Prize-winning Belfast-based organization Peace People. Thousands of women marched behind her and fellow Nobelist Betty Williams on the streets of Belfast, Derry, Dublin, and London, saying “enough” of the violence. That movement did not end the Troubles, but incidents of violence dropped by 70 percent thanks to that 1976–77 movement, according to data from the RUC Chief Constable’s Annual Report.

Corrigan-Maguire found an audience in America, and she found American political leaders willing to listen. Although the Peace People as a movement began to fade by the early 1980s, Mairead’s message continued to resonate. Whenever she came to America, people like Tip O’Neill and Ted Kennedy made time for her. She spoke from the heart and she spoke from the streets. In the years leading up to the IFI, she remained an effective voice for better solutions to the Troubles than more bullets, more guns, more violence. In later years, she carried that message to conflict zones around the globe.

Finally, the public work of organizations like the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) helped drive home the American concern that “justice that is seen to be just” had to be a part of the conversation in any government agreements, whether it was the Anglo-Irish Agreement or the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty or the IFI. [5] Civil rights lawyer and Queen’s law professor Tom Hadden, University of Galway Dean of Law Kevin Boyle, and social worker and professor Paddy Hillyard issued an updated edition of their seminal 1980 work “Ten Years On in Northern Ireland,” in which they documented the counterproductivity of many of the methods deployed by governments and security forces and proved statistically that the methods supposed to “control the violence” often actually did the opposite.

The CAJ used that analysis as text for its groundbreaking session in the midst of the hunger strikes on June 13, 1981, a session that was held on the same grounds where we stand today. The Queen’s Student Union was the only public facility that would allow the broad-based CAJ, which included members from all sides, to meet as a group. The student government leaders courageously rejected last-minute calls from school officials to withdraw that reservation. That first all-day session, co-chaired by Tom Hadden and me, brought together a variety of messengers with first-hand expertise on the conflict. Only the Provisional IRA declined our invitation to send a representative. Later, we found out why.

The honorary chair of that event was Lord Gardiner, a British peer, head of the progressive Howard League for Penal Reform, and most famously (or infamously, depending on your point of view) the author of the Gardiner Report, which argued that barracks-type free-form accommodations for prisoners during the Troubles was promoting, not discouraging, the violence. As the New York Times reported, the Provisional IRA attempted to assassinate Gardiner later that day, an action that forced an abrupt end to our deliberations then but not to the work that continues through to today.

During the five hours of presentations and discussion, it became evident to all that many of the combatants shared similar views on a number of issues: warrantless search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, imprisonment, etc. All those practices and their impact were meticulously documented in Ten Years On in Northern Ireland. The South African Special Powers Act approach was counterproductive in Northern Ireland, and these three authors documented it with factual data drawn from the RUC Chief Constable’s own Annual Reports and other data sources.

Over the next year, the CAJ produced reports on a number of these issues, reports that found their way into Congressional offices back in the U.S. They were unique at the time, in that support and authorship was widely shared among representatives from previously unconnected groups.

Even with all this new and factual information, there were still impediments to getting any of this to the finish line. That brings us to…

Sixth, the Competition on Issues

There was still yet another context in all this that required diplomatic attention in the mid-1980s, that of the competition on an emerging range of proposals and issues between the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland stoked by a variety of Irish American interest groups. The mid-1980s ushered in a raft of peace and justice initiatives and along with the IFI, they all coalesced in a relatively short span of time.

These efforts related to Ireland and Northern Ireland were happening almost on top of each other. Shortly after Mrs. Thatcher dismissed the work of the New Ireland Forum in December of 1984 with her abrupt “out, out, out,” American efforts to find a way forward, usually led by the Speaker and Friends of Ireland, redoubled. In short order, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, the MacBride Principles, the IFI, the creation of an economic envoy (a suggestion that originated from Senator Moynihan in 1985 and which morphed into Senator George Mitchell’s role in the Clinton Administration) and even the Belfast-based CAJ competed for attention in Washington, D.C. All these efforts got substantial coverage in the American and especially the Irish American press. Each effort had its own set of principal backers, some sharing support among Irish American expatriate and other groups.

As to the players behind the issues, Congressman Mario Biaggi’s Congressional Ad Hoc Committee on Irish Affairs, the Irish National Caucus and others backed the MacBride Principles approach and fiercely opposed the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty as it was initially drafted. The Irish government and the Four Horsemen did the hard work that helped get the Anglo-Irish Agreement to the finish line less than a year after Mrs. Thatcher’s dismissal of the New Ireland Forum. Thatcher confessed to one of her close advisors, Lord McAlpine, that, as Ambassador Donlan recounted and Conor O’Clery reported in the Irish Times at the time, “it was the pressure from the Americans that made me sign the agreement.”

This all led the way to the eventual passage of the IFI less than two years after “out, out, out” and to the key amendments that protected access to American courts in the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty. Those amendments, developed by Senators Eagleton and Biden, with critical help in committee and on the floor from Senators Kerry, Dodd, Bradley and Moynihan, successfully neutered the push from Mrs. Thatcher and the U.S. State Department to shield those decisions away from the bright lights of American courtrooms and to move them permanently, as the British Government had hoped, behind closed doors at the State Department.

These “Irish” issues were each competing with other causes from around the globe, ranging from Central America (very important to foreign policy leaders like Kennedy, Biden, Dodd and others and to the Speaker personally, whose first-hand sources in that part of the world included Maryknoll nuns whom he consulted regularly) to President Reagan’s nuclear Star Wars defense ambitions. It is remarkable that the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the re-designed Extradition Treaty and the IFI all came to conclusion in that 18-month period, with so many other important global issues on the table and Thatcher’s hardline views on almost everything related to Northern Ireland.

In Closing

In closing, I do not know that one could ever say that all this happened organically, or that even one part of it was planned, passed, designed, or destined from the start. Certainly, there were key players, many I am sure I have left out accidentally, who saw clearly, identified and cleared obstacles, and paved the pathways. But the way these disparate parties came together to pass several important pieces of legislation, culminating with a multi-nation jobs and reconciliation program called the International Fund for Ireland within 18 months of the British Prime Minister’s dramatic rejection of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is still remarkable. It happened for at least these five interactive factors:

• the major contributors making a collective decision to take over the center stage
• a clearer understanding of the context by key actors on both sides of the Atlantic
• the focus on relationship building by the big players but also by far less powerful but important “tenders” of the process
• a gradual recognition of some incontrovertible facts about the situation, including that violence (from bad laws or deadly weapons) and injustice could be two sides of the same coin
• key actors possessing the power and individual political prowess to navigate through complicated political (domestic and international) waters.

We can say without question that there has been real change in this place and that some part of that change happened because the IFI was created. I look forward to the next two panels documenting that change and its relationship to this novel political, economic and reconciliation tool that we call the International Fund for Ireland.

Thank you again to the John and Pat Hume Foundation for organizing this seminal event and for your attention here today.

Thomas P. Foley

Notes

[1] Representative James M. Shannon, “Mrs. Thatcher’s Opportunity to Pacify Northern Ireland,” New York Times, August 13, 1983, p. 23.

[2] Tip O’Neill and William Novak, Man of the House: The Life and Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O’Neill (New York: Random House, 1987), 192.

[3] Margaret Thatcher, Address to a Joint Session of Congress, February 20, 1985. Accessed October 22, 2026: https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/communication/address-joint-session-congress-feb-20-1985

[4] On a visit to their home in 2016, I asked John what he thought his most important contribution was; he responded, “the credit union.” His wife Pat later confirmed that “he sometimes thinks that.”

[5] For its work in the 45 years since its founding, the CAJ has received both the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Prize and the Reebok Human Rights Award.